Linear cryptanalysis is an important evaluation method for cryptographic primitives against key recovery attack. In this paper, we revisit the Walsh transformation for linear correlation calculation of modular addition, and an e cient algorithm is proposed to construct the input-output mask space of speci ed correlation weight. By ltering out the impossible large correlation weights in the rst round, the search space of the rst round can be substantially reduced. We introduce a concept of combinational linear approximation table (cLAT) for modular addition with two inputs. When one input mask is xed, another input mask and the output mask can be obtained by the Splitting-Lookup-Recombination approach. We rst split the n-bit xed input mask into several subvectors and then nd the corresponding bits of other masks, and in the recombination phase, pruning conditions can be used. By this approach, a large number of search branches in the middle rounds can be pruned. With the combination of the optimization strategies and the branch-and-bound search algorithm, we can improve the search e ciency for linear characteristics on ARX ciphers. e linear hulls for SPECK32/48/64 with a higher average linear potential (ALP) than existing results have been obtained. For SPARX variants, an 11-round linear trail and a 10-round linear hull have been found for SPARX-64 and a 10-round linear trail and a 9-round linear hull are obtained for SPARX-128. For Chaskey, a 5-round linear trail with a correlation of 2 − 61 has been obtained. For CHAM-64, 34/35-round optimal linear characteristics with a correlation of 2 − 31 /2 − 33 are found.
Introduction
e three components: modular addition, rotation, and XOR, constitute the basic operations in ARX cryptographic primitives [1] . In ARX ciphers, modular additions provide nonlinearity di usion with e cient software implementation and low dependencies on computing resources. Compared with S-box-based ciphers, ARX ciphers do not need to store S-box in advance, which can reduce the occupation of storage resources, especially in resource-constrained devices. In addition, ARX ciphers do not need to query S-boxes in the encryption and decryption process, which can reduce a lot of query operations. erefore, ARX construction is preferred by many designers of lightweight ciphers. At present, there are many primitives used in this construction, such as HIGHT [2] , SPECK [3] , LEA [4] , Chaskey [5] , SPARX [6] , and CHAM [7] .
Until now, cryptanalysis on ARX ciphers is still not well understood as S-box-based ciphers, and the security analysis on them are relatively lagging behind [8] . Linear cryptanalysis is very important for evaluating the security margin of symmetric cryptographic primitives [9, 10] . e linear approximation tables of S-box-based ciphers mostly can be constructed and stored directly; however, the full linear approximation table of modular addition will be too large to store when the word length of modular addition is large.
For linear cryptanalysis of ARX ciphers, one crucial step is to calculate the linear correlation of modular addition. In [11] [12] [13] [14] , the linear properties of modular addition have been carefully studied. In [13] , a method to calculate the linear correlation of modular addition recursively was proposed, but the calculation process that was based on state transition in bit level leads to high complexity. Based on this method, only the optimal linear characteristics for the variants of SPECK32 [15] and SPECK32/48 [16] were found.
In 2013, Schulte-Geers used CCZ equivalence to improve the explicit formula for the calculation of linear correlation of modular addition [17] . Based on the improved formula and SAT solver model, Liu et al. obtained better linear characteristics for SPECK [18] , the optimal linear trails for SPECK32/48/64 with correlation close to the security boundary (2 − n/2 ) were obtained, and the 9/10-round linear hull with a potential of 2 − 29.1 /2 − 32.1 for SPECK32 was obtained.
According to the position of the starting round of the search algorithm, there are currently 3 types of automatic search technologies for linear/differential cryptanalysis on ARX primitives. ey are bottom-up techniques [15] , topdown techniques [19] [20] [21] , and the method of extending from the middle to the ends [22] . In these methods, the linear correlations are directly calculated based on the inputoutput masks or by looking up the precomputed partial linear approximation table (pLAT) [23] . For addition modulo 2 n with two inputs, the correlations need to be calculated based on the known input-output masks. However, in the search process for linear characteristics of ARX ciphers, due to the existence of three-forked branches, in most case, for the input-output masks ((v, w) ⟶ u) of modular addition, only one input mask v is determined, and another input mask w and the output mask u are unknown. Although all 2 2n space of (w, u) can be traversed in a trivial way, it is very time-consuming.
High efficiency query operations can be achieved by constructing a linear approximation table of reasonable storage size. e pLAT can store the input-output masks whose linear correlation is greater than a certain threshold [15] . When the branches cannot be queried in pLAT and that need to be calculated by the input-output masks, the calculation process will lead to a significant reduction in search efficiency. Although the heuristic method can speed up the search, it cannot guarantee the results will be the best [24] . erefore, constructing a search model based on the precise correlation calculation formula and realizing an efficient search for linear characteristics on ARX ciphers are still a study worth working on. e motivation of this paper is to investigate how to speed up the search algorithm in order to realize the search for linear (hull) characteristics on typical ARX ciphers.
Our Contributions.
In this paper, we first revisit the linear correlation calculation of modular addition and introduce an algorithm to construct the input-output masks of specific correlation weight. en, we propose a novel concept of combinational linear approximation table (cLAT) and introduce an algorithm to generate the lookup tables. Combining with these two optimization algorithms, we propose an automatic algorithm to search for the optimal linear characteristics on ARX ciphers. In the first round, we can exclude the search space of the nonoptimal linear trails by increasing the correlation weight of each modular addition monotonically. In the middle rounds, the undetermined masks and the corresponding correlation weight of each modular addition can be obtained by querying the cLAT, and a large number of nonoptimal branches can be filtered out during the recombination phase. Also, the algorithm can be appropriately modified for the heuristic search.
As applications, for SPECK32/48/64, the 9/11/14-round linear hulls are obtained. For SPARX-64, the 11-round linear trail with a correlation of 2 − 28 and a 10-round linear hull with an ALP of 2 − 40.92 are found. For SPARX-128, we can experimentally get the optimal linear trails of the first eight rounds, and we get a 10-round linear trail with a correlation of 2 − 23 . For Chaskey, the linear characteristics covering more rounds are updated, and a 5-round linear trail with a correlation of 2 − 61 is found. For CHAM-64, we find a new 34round optimal linear trail with a correlation of 2 − 31 . A summary table is shown in Table 1 .
Roadmap.
is paper is organized as follows. We first present some preliminaries used in this paper in Section 2. In Section 3, we introduce the algorithm for constructing the space of input-output mask tuples, the algorithm for constructing cLAT, and the improved automatic search algorithm for linear cryptanalysis on ARX ciphers. In Section 4, we apply the new tool to several typical ARX ciphers. Finally, we conclude our work in Section 5.
Preliminaries
2.1. Notation. For addition modulo 2 n , i.e., x ⊞ y � z, we use the symbols ⋘ and ⋙ to indicate rotation to the left and right and ≪ and ≫ to indicate the left and right shift operation, respectively. e binary operator symbols ⊕ , ∨, ∧ , || , and ¬ represent XOR, OR, AND, concatenation, and bitwise NOT, respectively. For a vector x, wt(x) represents its Hamming weight and x i is the i th bit of it. 0 is a zero vector.
Linear Correlation Calculation for Modular Addition.
Let F n 2 be the n dimensional vector space over binary field
for Boolean function f : F n 2 ⟶ F 2 and h : F n 2 ⟶ F 2 , x ∈ F n 2 , the linear correlation between f and h can be denoted by
For modular addition x ⊞ y � z, let (v, w) be the input masks, u be the output mask, and · be the standard inner product. According to the definition of linear correlation, when (v · x ⊞ w · y) ⊕ u · z � 0, the linear approximation probability is defined as
Let μ(t) � (− 1) t , then the linear correlation of modular addition can be denoted by Walsh transformation, and thus,
where ε is the bias. When (v · x ⊞ w · y) ⊕ u · z � 1, the linear approximation probability is Pr(u, v, w) � (1/2) − ε. e linear correlation can be denoted by
(4)
We call Cw(u, v, w) � − log 2 Cor(u, v, w) as the correlation weight, and the linear square correlation can be denoted by
For addition x ⊞ y modulo 2 n , it can be rewritten as
e first-order approximation is carry(x, y) � (x ∧ y) ≪ 1. If all carry(x, y) j � 0 for j ≤ i, and 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, the highorder approximation is
In [13] , Wallén introduced the theorem to calculate the linear correlation by analyzing the carry high-order approximation function recursively. In [12] , based on the bit state transformation, the formula to calculate the correlation was given by the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (See [12] ). For addition modulo 2 n , let v and w be the input masks and u be the output mask. Define an auxiliary vector d � d n− 1 · · · d 0 , and each d i � u i ‖v i ‖w i ∈ F 3 2 is an octal word, 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. en, the linear correlation can be denoted by
where the row vector L � (1 0), the column vector C � (1 1) T , and each 2 × 2 matrix A d i is defined by
In [17] , Schulte-Geers extended eorem 1 and derived a fully explicit formula for the linear correlation calculation, given by eorem 2.
Theorem 2 (See [17] ). For addition modulo 2 n with inputoutput mask tuple (u, v, w), a vectorial Boolean function M : F n 2 ⟶ F n 2 denotes the partial sum mapping:
Let z ≔ M T (u ⊕ v ⊕ w) � (0, x n− 1 , x n− 1 ⊕ x n− 2 , · · · , x n− 1 ⊕ x n− 2 ⊕ · · · x 1 ), then the linear correlation can be denoted by
where 1 G f is an indicator function for graph G f ≔ (x, f(x)) | x ∈ F n 2 ; for n-bit vectors a and b, a ⪯ b represents
In iterative ciphers, the correlation of a single r-round linear trail is the product of the correlations of each round [25] . Assuming that there are N A additions modulo 2 n with two inputs in i th round, Γ in and Γ out are the input and output masks of the r-round linear trail, and the correlation of it can be denoted by
The linear approximation of a linear hull represents the potential of all linear trails with same input-output masks [26] . e averaged linear potential (ALP) can be counted by the following formula:
Assuming that the key k is selected uniformly from the key space K, the statistics of ALP can be formulated as (13) , where T[Cw] is the number of trails with correlation weight of Cw. Let C min be the correlation weight of the linear trail 
2.3. Linear Properties of SPECK, SPARX, Chaskey, and CHAM. e SPECK family ciphers were designed by NSA in 2013 [3] . e SPARX family ciphers were introduced by Dinu et al. at ASIACRYPT′16 [6] . In SPARX, the nonlinear ARX-box (SPECKEY) is obtained by modifying the round function of SPECK32. e linear mask propagation properties of the round function in SPECK and SPECKEY are shown in Figure 1 . e rotation parameters (r a , r b ) (7, 2) for SPECK32, while (r a , r b ) (8, 3) for other variants.
If the input-output masks
) of the modular additions in the two consecutive rounds of SPECK are known, the input and output masks of these two rounds can be denoted by Property 1.
e linear layer functions L/L ′ [6] for SPARX-64 and SPARX-128 are shown in Figure 2 . Due to the existence of the three-forked branches, the masks of the linear transformation layer have the following properties. 
Chaskey is a MAC algorithm introduced by Mouha et al. at SAC′14 [5] , and an enhanced variant was proposed in 2015 [27] , which increases the number of permutation rounds from 8 to 12. e round function of the permutation (v0 ′ , v1 ′ , v2 ′ , v3 ′ ) π(v0, v1, v2, v3) is shown in Figure 3 . e 4 modular additions are labeled by A0, A1, A2, and A3, respectively. e input mask (a, b, c, d) and the output mask 
CHAM is a family of lightweight block ciphers that was proposed by Koo et al. at ICISC′17, which blends the good designs of SIMON and SPECK [7] . 3 variants of CHAM have two kinds of block size, i.e., CHAM-64 and CHAM-128. e linear mask propagation for the 4 consecutive rounds of CHAM is shown in Figure 4 . If the input-output mask tuples of each modular addition of the rst 4 rounds are given, the input and output masks of the rst 4 rounds can be deduced by Property 5. 
Automatic Search for the Linear Characteristics on ARX Ciphers

Input-Output Masks of Speci c Correlation
Weight. e number of input-output mask tuples in the rst round is closely related to the complexity of the branch-and-bound search algorithm, but traversing all possible input masks of the rst round will result in high complexity. An alternative approach is to consider the possible correlation weight corresponding to the input-output masks and exclude those tuples that have a large correlation weight. However, for a xed correlation weight, it may correspond to multiple input-output mask tuples although the correlation can be calculated by eorem 2 when the input-output masks are xed for a modular addition. For addition modulo 2 n , its maximum correlation weight is n − 1, and the size of the total space S of all input-output mask tuples is 2 3n . We can rank the correlation weights Cw from 0 to n − 1 and construct the input-output masks subspace S Cw corresponding to correlation weight Cw, 0 ≤ Cw ≤ n − 1. erefore, the total space S can be divided into n subspaces, i.e., S ∪ n− 1 Cw 0 S Cw .
De nition 1. Let ((v, w) ⟶ u) be the input-output masks for a modular addition with nonzero correlation. Let us
De nition 2. Let us de ne three sets that ξ i may belong to, i.e., U 0 1, 2, 4, 7 { } , U 1 0, 3, 5, 6 { } , and U 2 0, 7 { }. In eorem 2, when the correlation of a modular addition is nonzero, the value distribution of the 3 consecutive bits in z and the 3 consecutive words in 
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Φ has the following relationships, shown in Observation 1.
Hence, the value of ξ i � u i ‖v i ‖w i depends on whether the bit positions of z i+1 and z i are active. e last significant bits (u 0 , v 0 , w 0 ) of the input-output masks construct the value of ξ 0 , which is only related to the Hamming weight of
. erefore, if we get the Hamming weight distribution of z, from the LSB to MSB direction, as z 0 is determined, ξ 0 can be obtained. Next, x 1 � z 1 ⊕ z 0 is determined, and u 1 ⊕ v 1 ⪯ wt(z 1 ) and u 1 ⊕ w 1 ⪯ wt(z 1 ) should be satisfied; hence, the possible values of ξ 1 can be obtained. Recursively, all ξ i values can be constructed as an octal word sequence from the LSB to MSB direction to subject to the above observation. Hence, the tuples of (u, v, w) can be generated from the elements in Φ. e process to construct the subspace S Cw is shown in Algorithm 1, marked as Const (S Cw ). Table. For addition modulo 2 n , the full LAT requires a storage size of 2 3n ; when n is too large, it will be very difficult to store. To facilitate the storage, an intuitive approach is to store only a part of the full LAT. For a n-bit vector, we can split it into t subvectors of m bits, where n � mt. When each m-bit subvector is determined, the n-bit vector can be obtained by concatenating.
Combinational Linear Approximation
is idea gives birth to the concept of combinatorial LAT (cLAT).
Corollary 1.
Let u, v, w ∈ F n 2 be the input-output masks of the modular addition with nonzero correlation, and let
Splitting the vectors
en, the correlation weight of the modular addition can be denoted by
when
Proof. wt(z) is the sum of the Hamming weight of each
□ If the m-bit subvector z k+1 adjacent to z k is known, z k can be calculated by subvector tuple (u k , v k , w k ) and the lowest bit of z k+1 . We call (u k , v k , w k ) as a subblock, and we call the bit z (k+1)m ∈ 0, 1 { } as the connection status when used in the calculation of z k . Splitting the n-bit vector z into t subvectors, there should have t − 1 connection status z j , j ∈ (t − 1)m, · · · , 2m, m { }, and for the highest subvector, its connection status b � 0. Hence, for the highest subblock (u t− 1 , v t− 1 , and w t− 1 ), the Hamming weight of z t− 1 and the bit z (t− 1)m can be obtained, recursively, and the Hamming weight of the remaining subvectors can also be obtained. erefore, as connection status b ∈ 0, 1 { } and u k , v k , w k ∈ F m 2 , we can construct a m-bit lookup table for modular addition in advance and query the tables by indexing input-output masks and the connection status. In addition, the connection status for the next subblock can also be generated.
In the top-down search techniques for the ARX ciphers, for the modular additions in the middle rounds, in most cases, only one input mask is fixed (assuming it is v), and another input mask w and the output mask u are unknown. In the lookup tables, we need to lookup all valid subvectors of (u, w) that correspond to nonzero correlation based on v. e lookup table (called as cLAT) is constructed by Algorithm 2, and it takes about 4 seconds on a 2.5 GHz CPU to generate the table with storage size about 1.2 GByte when m � 8.
3.3.
Splitting-Lookup-Recombination. Algorithm 2 constructs a m-bit cLAT for the addition modulo 2 n , and this section describes how to use it. When one input mask is fixed, we can get another input mask, the output mask, and the corresponding correlation weight by the Splitting-Lookup-Recombination approach, which contains three steps.
3.3.1.
Splitting. For addition modulo 2 n , n � mt, if one of the two input masks v is fixed, then split v into tm-bit subvectors. e larger the m, the fewer the times to lookup cLAT and the fewer the number of bit concatenation operations, but the more space the memory takes up, and after the trade-offs, we choose m � 8.
Lookup.
From the MSB to the LSB direction, query the subvectors of (u, w) that correspond to each subvector of v and the corresponding correlation weights. For the highest m-bit subvector v t− 1 , its connection status b � 0, looking up cLAT to get w t− 1 and u t− 1 , the corresponding correlation weight c[t − 1], and the connection status for the subvector v t− 2 . Similarly, other subvectors of u and w and the corresponding correlation weights can be obtained.
Recombination.
All subvectors of u and w can be obtained by lookup tables, and the n-bit u and w can be obtained by bit concatenation. e correlation weight of the modular addition is the sum of the weight of each subblock, i.e., Cw � t− 1 k�0 c [k] . When there are multiple modular additions in the round function, i.e., N A > 1, for each modular addition, its undetermined input mask and output mask need to be obtained by the Splitting-Lookup-Recombination approach, respectively. In the lookup phase, a total of tN A lookup Input: Cw and Λ � λ Cw , . . . , λ 1 . Each pattern of the Hamming weight distribution of z can be calculated by the combination algorithm in [28] , which is the combination pattern of n − 1 Cw , where ξ i � u i ‖v i ‖w i for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. (14) if λ c ≠ i then (15) if Fw � 0 then //Fw recorded whether the value of λ i− 1 is 1 or not. (16) For each ξ i � 0 and Fw′ � 0, call Func_Middle (i + 1, c, Fw′); (17) else (18) For each ξ i � 7 and Fw′ � 0, call Func_Middle (i + 1, c, Fw′); (19) end if (20) else //λ c � i. e value of Fw determines whether ξ i belongs to U 0 or U 1 . (21) if Fw � 0 then (22) For each ξ i ∈ U 0 and Fw′ � 1, call Func_Middle (i + 1, c + 1, Fw′); (23) else (24) For each ξ i ∈ U 1 and Fw′ � 1, call Func_Middle (i + 1, c + 1, Fw′); (25) end if (26) During the Recombination phase, the correlation boundary can be constructed by the associated weights that have been obtained and the possible minimum correlation weights, shown in Corollary 2.
Corollary 2. For addition modulo 2 n , one of the input mask
v � v t− 1 ‖ · · · ‖v 0 is fixed, n � mt, v k ∈ F m 2 , and 0 ≤ k ≤ t − 1.
For any u, w ∈ F n 2 of nonzero correlation, the correlation boundary should have
Proof. e correlation of modular addition is the product of the correlation of each subblock after splitting, i.e.,
be the correlation weight of the subvector tuples that are obtained by lookup tables. e sum of the correlation weights of the subvector tuples have not been looked up yet, which should
□ Assuming the number of (u k , w k ) corresponding to each subvector v k is X k , hence, the number of mask branches corresponding to the modular addition is t− 1 k�0 X k . Corollary 2 can be used to filter out (u, w) of large correlation weight.
Improved Automatic Search Algorithm.
In this section, we adopt a top-down technique [19] [20] [21] , taking the first round as the starting point of the search process. In the first/second rounds, the input-output mask tuples of each modular addition with correlation weight increasing monotonically can be obtained by Algorithm 1. In the middle rounds, for each modular addition, u and w can be obtained by the Splitting-Lookup-Recombination approach. Algorithm 3 takes SPECK as an example.
Let the optimal correlation weight of the (r − i) th round that has been obtained be Bc r− i , 1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1, and let the expected r-round correlation weight be Bc r . e correlation weight of the first two rounds should subject to Matsui's (1) 
for each input mask w ∈ F m 2 and output mask u ∈ F m 2 do
end for (8) if b � 1 then //determining the connection status generated by the upper subblock.
end if (13) for i � 1 to m − 1 do //determining the correlation weight.
end if (18) end for
[Cw] + +; //the number of tuples correspond to v and b. (24) cLAT
> Cw then (26) cLAT min [v] [b] � Cw; //the minimum correlation weight corresponds to v and b. (27) end if (28) end if (29) end for (30) end for. 
′ is the number of additions in the first two rounds, and then the search space need to be constructed is no more than (19) . When the block size of a ARX cipher is large, let n be the word size of the modular addition, the total input-output masks of all N A ′ modular additions in the first two round is S ′ � 2 3n×N A ′ . erefore, when the value of Bc r − Bc r− 1 is small, the search space S will be much smaller than S ′ intuitively:
Flexible Search Scenario Settings.
Combining Algorithm 1, cLAT, pruning conditions, and the properties of the target ciphers in Section 2.3, Algorithm 3 can be adapted to the following search scenarios with appropriate modifications:
Scenario 1: for some ARX ciphers, such as SPARX and Chaskey, the number of modular additions in the round function is more than 1, N A > 1. Hence, the correlation weight of each round is Cw i � N A j�1 Cw j i , and Cw j i is the correlation weight of the j th addition in the i th round. In the first/second round, the inputoutput masks of each modular addition should be generated by Algorithm 1. In the middle rounds, the tuple (u, w) of each modular addition should be obtained by calling LR(v) multiple times. Scenario 2: the linear hulls can also be searched by simply modifying Algorithm 3. For an obtained optimal linear trail, fix the input mask of the first round and the output mask of the last round, call round-r (i, x, y) directly, and modify Bc r to the expected maximum statistical correlation weight C max . erefore, for ALP, all linear trails with linear correlation weight between the optimal correlation weight C min and C max can be counted. Scenario 3: when the number of rounds of a linear trail or the block size is large, the linear correlation tends to be very small, and the search process will be very timeconsuming. Hence, good linear characteristic results under certain conditions can be explored by the heuristic search settings. We can exclude a large number of search branches and reduce the search complexity by these methods, such as starting the search from a desired large correlation weight Bc r , fixing the input mask of a certain round, and limiting the correlation weight of a round or a certain modular addition.
Applied to SPECK, SPARX, Chaskey, and CHAM-64
4.1. Linear Hulls for SPECK32/48/64. Applying Algorithm 3, the optimal linear trails for SPECK32/48/64 with correlation close to 2 − n/2 can be obtained, shown in Table 2 . Fixing the input and output masks, the ALP of the linear hulls obtained by the cluster experiment are given in Table 3 . For SPECK64, new 14-round linear hull with an average linear potential of 2 − 61.24 has been found. When searching for the linear hulls, we need to modify Algorithm 3 to adapt to Scenario 2. We use formula (13) to count ALP, where C min ≤ Cw ≤ C max , C min is the correlation weight of the linear trail we choose to use to pin the input and output masks, and C max is the maximum correlation weight we limit our search. In the middle rounds, we adopt C max to instead Bc r for filtering out those trails that contribute less to the ALP.
Linear Characteristics for SPARX.
Searching for the optimal linear trails of SPARX variants, Algorithm 3 needs to be modified to fit Scenario 1. ere are multiple modular additions in each round, N A � 2 for SPARX-64 and N A � 4 for SPARX-128. Hence, for all 2N A additions modulo 2 16 in the first/second rounds, call Algorithm 1 for each addition to generate its input-output mask tuples, and then apply Property 3/4 to obtain the masks of the first two rounds for SPARX-64 and SPARX-128, respectively. In the middle rounds, the Splitting-Lookup-Recombination method is applied to obtain possible input masks and output masks of each addition, as well as correlation weight. e 10-round optimal linear trails for SPARX-64 are listed in Table 4 , and the 11-round linear trail is obtained by limiting the correlation weight of each modular addition less than 3 in the first two rounds. Fixing the input and output mask of the 10round optimal linear trail, a 10-round linear hull with an ALP of 2 − 40.92 is obtained.
For SPARX-128, the first 8-round optimal linear trails can be derived from the first 8-round optimal linear trails of SPECK32 when considering the minimum active ARX-box. e experiment results in Table 5 confirmed the derivation. Based on Scenario 3, we limit the correlation weight of each modular addition in the first/second round to less than 2, then we get the 9/10round linear trails with a correlation weight of 18/23. Although the 9/10-round linear trail cannot be guaranteed as the best, they can still be used to get the 9/10round linear hulls with the corresponding ALP of 2 − 35.22 /2 − 46 . e 11/10-round linear trails for SPARX-64/SPARX-128 are given by Table 6 . c r j represents the correlation weight of the j th modular addition in the r th round, and Cw r represents the correlation weight of the r th round, 0 ≤ j < N A . Table 7 , the correlation weights of the first 3-round optimal linear trails of Chaskey we have found are 0/2/9. For one-round optimal linear trail with a correlation weight of 0, inputoutput masks represented in hexadecimal are (1, 1, 0, 0) and (0, 80, 800000, 0). To find the linear trails with longer rounds, we use a heuristic approach in Scenario 3, limiting the correlation weight of each modular additions in the first round to less than 2 and setting the correlation weight
Linear Characteristics for Chaskey. From
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Input: the cLAT is precomputed and stored by Algorithm 2. Bw 1 , · · · , Bw r− 1 have been recorded (1) Program entry: (2) Let Bc r � Bc r− 1 − 1, and Bc r � null //Bw 1 can be derived manually for most ARX ciphers.
(3) while Bc r ≠ Bc r do (4) Bc r + +; //the expected r-round correlation weight increases monotonously. (5) Call Procedure Round-1; (6) end while (7) Exit the program. (8) Round-1:/exclude the search space with correlation weights larger than Bc r − Bc r− 1 . (9) for Cw 1 � 0 to n − 1 do //Cw 1 increases monotonously. (10) if Cw 1 + Bc r− 1 > Bc r then (11) Return to the upper procedure with FALSE state; (12) else (13) Call Algorithm 1 Const (S Cw 1 ), and traverse each output tuple (u 1 , v 1 , w 1 ); (14) if call Round-2(u 1 , v 1 , w 1 ) and the return value is TRUE, then (15) Stop Algorithm 1 and return TRUE; /record the optimal linear trail be found. (16) end if (17) end if (18) end for (19) Return to the upper procedure with FALSE state; (20) Round-2(u 1 , v 1 , w 1 ): /exclude the correlation weights larger than Bc r − Bc r− 1 − Cw 1 . (21) for Cw 2 � 0 to n − 1 //Cw 2 increases monotonously. (22) if Cw 1 + Cw 2 + Bc r− 2 > Bc r then (23) Return to the upper procedure with FALSE state; (24) else (25) Call Algorithm 1 Const (S Cw 2 ), and traverse each output tuple (u 2 , v 2 , w 2 ); to the expected values to start the heuristic search. e 4/ 5-round linear trails with correlation weights of 29/61 are obtained. e details of the linear trails are listed in Table 8 .
Linear Characteristics for CHAM-64.
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Conclusions
In this paper, we have improved the automatic search algorithm for the linear characteristics on ARX ciphers. Combining with the optimization strategies of constructing the input-output masks corresponding to specific correlation weight and the novel concept of cLAT, this search tool enables an efficient search for the linear characteristics on typical ARX ciphers. Applying this tool, we get new 9/ 10/14-round linear hulls for SPECK32/48/64, and the ALP is 2 − 27.78 , 2 − 43.64 , and 2 − 61. 24 , respectively. For SPARX-64, a 10-round optimal linear trail with a correlation of 2 − 22 and a 11-round good linear trail with a correlation of 2 − 28 have been obtained. For SPARX-128, a 10-round linear trail with a correlation of 2 − 23 is obtained. e linear cryptanalysis results on SPARX are presented for the first time so far. For Chaskey, the linear characteristic results have been 0  0  0  2  00000000081008100000000000000000  0  1  0  0  1  3  0004000400070007  1  2  3  3  000000000C010E000000000000000000  0  3  0  0  3  L  2C1020102C1C201 C  ---4  00000000364834500000000000000000  0  5  0  0  5  4  2C1C201C00000000  4  0  4  L′  00000000008A90E20000000000000000  -----5  3140013000000000  3  0  3  5  000000000000000000000000008A90E2  0  0  0  2  2  6  858D05CF00000000  4  0  4  6  000000000000000000000000078F138E  0  0  0  4  4  L  60117B1800000000  ---7  000000000000000000000000000E1600  0  0  0  2  2  7  0000000060117B18  0  4  4  8  00000000000000000000000000001800  0  0  0  0  0  8  0000000000812261  0  3  3  L′  00000000000000000000000060006000  -----9  0000000080018280  0  1  1  9  00000000600060006000000000006000  0  1  1  0  2  L  0000000000020202  ---10  00000000828182010280020080018001  0  2  1  1  4  10  0002020200000200  1  0  1  11  0000000002150012081308140A060806  -----11  1E08180808000800  3  1  4  12 38A8208020582040 --- updated, which cover more rounds than the existing results. For CHAM-64, the linear characteristics we obtained are the first third-party linear cryptanalysis results. In addition, we believe that these improved optimization strategies can also be achieved by linear cryptanalysis on other ARX ciphers.
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